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This paper aims to determine the optimal date for an employee to initiate the pension payments from the New Zealand Government Superannuation Fund (GSF), through retirement or job shifting.

The paper uses discounted cash flow methods in conjunction with mortality tables, inflation estimates and a range of values for the yield on inflation-adjusted bonds in New Zealand.

The paper finds that, if job shifting is costless, then the optimal exit date is between 60 and 65. If job switching is costly, then this paper determines the effective salary reduction arising from continuing to work at the GSF-associated job beyond the optimal job switching age under costless job switching, arising from the adverse impact on the present value of the pension benefits, so as to assist in deciding when to switch jobs or retire. These effective salary reductions are small below 65 but rapidly rise after that, thereby significantly discouraging work much beyond age 65.

This paper assists GSF members to determine when to switch jobs or retire.

Hall (2007) challenges a fundamental point in the analysis of Lally (2007) and earlier papers: if the risk free rate within the allowed rate of return matches the regulatory term, then the present value of future cash flows PV0 equals equityholders initial investment C(1−L). Hall argues that this result implicitly assumes that forward rates equal expected spot rates. If this were true, it would undercut Lally’s analysis because the empirical evidence does not support the alleged assumption.

Land rents are sometimes set at a fixed percentage of land value called the ground rental rate, with the land value periodically revised. Intuitively the frequency of revision should affect the appropriate rental rate. This paper derives the relationship between the rental rate and the frequency of revision. Depending upon discount rales and the expected growth rale in land value, the relationship may be positive or negative. In addition the revision frequency governs the extent to which inflation driven increases in interest rates induce changes in the rental rate. The latter changes range from virtually nothing to changes in tandem with interest rates.

From 2007, New Zealand firms must report the cost of granting employee stock options (ESOs). Market‐based option pricing models assume that option holders are unconstrained in their portfolio choices and thus are indifferent to the specific risk of any firm. By contrast, ESO holders are frequently required to hold portfolios that are over‐exposed to the firm that employs them and so adopt exercise policies that reflect their individual risk preferences. Applying the model of Ingersoll (2006) to hypothetical ESOs, we show that ESO cost can be extremely sensitive to employee characteristics of risk aversion and under‐diversification. This result casts doubt on the usefulness of any market‐based model for pricing ESOs, since such models, by definition, produce option values that are independent of employee characteristics. By limiting employee discretion over the choice of exercise date, vesting restrictions help reduce the magnitude of this problem.

This paper examines the appropriate term of the risk free rate to be used by a regulator in price control situations, most particularly in the presence of corporate debt. If the regulator seeks to ensure that the present value of the future cash flows to equity holders equals their initial investment then the only choice of term for the risk free rate that can achieve this is that matching the regulatory cycle, but it also requires that the firm match its debt duration to the regulatory cycle. Failure of the firm to do so leads to cash flows to equity holders whose net present value will tend to be negative, and will also inflict interest rate risk upon equity holders. This provides the firm with strong incentives to match its debt duration to the regulatory cycle.

This paper seeks to compare the capitalisation rate offered by the Government Superannuation Fund (GSF) to retiring GSF members with the alternatives of borrowing and sale of the pension entitlements.

The paper uses standard discounted cash flow techniques.

The principal conclusions are as follows: first, while up to 50 per cent of a GSF member's pension claims can be effectively sold, the restriction that the buyer must be an individual implies a band of possible sale prices with an upper bound equal to that prevailing if sales were unrestricted (present value). Second, borrowing is increasingly favoured over capitalisation as the retirement age declines, and the critical retirement age below which borrowing dominates capitalisation is 64 for men and 66 for women if the GSF member has a spouse at the retirement date and otherwise about three years less. Third, the present value of the pension benefits is well in excess of both the capitalisation rate offered by the GSF and the capitalisation rate implicit in borrowing, implying sale prices even well below present value that are superior to the better of capitalisation and borrowing.

The analysis treats the retirement age of a GSF member as exogenously determined. However, the analysis also provides insights into the optimal retirement age and this issue is currently the subject of further research.

The paper should provide guidance to GSF members who are contemplating capitalisation of their entitlements.

Daniel and Titman (1997) contend that the Fama‐French three‐factor model’s ability to explain cross‐sectional variation in expected returns is a result of characteristics that firms have in common rather than any risk‐based explanation. The primary aim of the current paper is to provide out‐of‐sample tests of the characteristics versus risk factor argument. The main focus of our tests is to examine the intercept terms in Fama‐French regressions, wherein test portfolios are formed by a three‐way sorting procedure on book‐to‐market, size and factor loadings. Our main test focuses on ‘characteristic‐balanced’ portfolio returns of high minus low factor loading portfolios, for different size and book‐to‐market groups. The Fama‐French model predicts that these regression intercepts should be zero while the characteristics model predicts that they should be negative. Generally, despite the short sample period employed, our findings support a risk‐factor interpretation as opposed to a characteristics interpretation. This is particularly so for the HML loading‐based test portfolios. More specifically, we find that: the majority of test portfolios tend to reveal higher returns for higher loadings (while controlling for book‐to‐market and size characteristics); the majority of the Fama‐French regression intercepts are statistically insignificant; for the characteristic‐balanced portfolios, very few of the Fama‐French regression intercepts are significant.

This paper examines the Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH) for aggregate New Zealand share market returns, as well as the CRSP NYSE‐AMEX (USA) index during the 1980‐2001 period. Using several indices, we rely on the variance‐ratio test and find evidence to support the rejection of the RWH with some evidence of a momentum effect. However, we find evidence to suggest the behaviour of share prices to be time‐dependent in New Zealand. For example, we find the indices tested were closer to random after the 1987 share market crash. Further analysis showed even stronger results for periods subsequent to the passage of the Companies Act 1993 and the Financial Reporting Act 1993. We also find evidence that indices based on large capitalisation stocks are more likely to follow a random walk compared to those based on smaller stocks. For the USA index, we find stronger evidence of random behaviour in our sample period compared to the earlier period examined by Lo and Mackinlay (1988)

Points out that preference shares are much more heavily used in emerging economies than in advanced ones to finance new investment projects and develops a mathematical model to show the conditions under which companies are willing to issue them at a price which will attract investors. Outlines the tax systems in Taiwan, South Korea and New Zealand and uses the model to explain why companies in the former two countries issue preference share but New Zealand firms to not.